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One of the challenges for an integrated history and philosophy of science is “the dilemma of case 
studies”: the argument that neither a “top-down” nor a “bottom-up” approach is obviously fruitful (see 
Joseph Pitt, 2001, Perspectives on Science). On the one hand, if we start with philosophical theses and 
proceed “downward” to historical cases, we must always suspect that the cases were chosen so as to fit 
our philosophical preconceptions. In other words, cases can never give real support to philosophical 
theses because of the possibility of selection bias. On the other hand, if we start with history of science 
and proceed “upward” to philosophy, then we do not have any obvious warrant for generalizations: 
Proper support for a philosophical thesis cannot derive from its applicability to one, two or even several 
cases. 
 
 Instead of accepting these challenges as refutations of the integrated approach, the dilemma of case 
studies should be taken as an opportunity: It points towards the need for an explicit methodology for 
the practice of integrated history and philosophy of science. 
 
 Where skeptics worry about selection bias, we argue that robust criteria for the choice of historical 
cases are required. Among the categories we propose are paradigm cases and hard cases. Paradigm 
cases are historical episodes which are already considered to be typical of particular aspects of science 
(say, confirmation) – and which thus may be used to make new points particularly effectively. Hard 
cases are chosen in order to make confirmation bias unlikely: They are structured such that they 
challenge rather than illustrate the philosophical thesis under consideration. The difficult question, of 
course, is what makes a case “hard”.  Where skeptics argue that generalizations from historical cases are 
unwarranted in principle, we prefer to formulate fruitful procedures for dealing with either a match or a 
mismatch between philosophical theses and historical cases. For instance, instead of rejecting a 
philosophical thesis based on one or two counterexamples, counterexamples may indicate that a 
domain cannot be subsumed under a single philosophical category (e.g. several categories of 
explanation may exist, each of which finds counterexamples in the others). By contrast, when historical 
data matches a philosophical thesis, this should be understood not as straightforward “support” but 
instead as the beginning of an exploration of the range of applicability of the thesis. 
 
We will illustrate each of our theses using cases from our own research in HPS. These include, among 
others, Semmelweis’s discovery of the cause of childbed fever, the development of photosynthesis 
research in the late 19th and early 20th century, Volterra’s predator-prey model and Mitchell’s 
chemiosmotic theory.  This is a synthetic presentation of a number arguments and conclusions 
presented at a recent workshop titled “The philosophy of historical case studies”, held at the University 
of Bern on November 21-22, 2013 (http://hpsbern2013.wordpress.com). 
 
